A lack of attention to the details nearly costed two Lithuanian presidential candidates their credibility. Misled by the email adress, convinced that they were talking to a credible Russian outlet based in Latvia, they accepted an interview with the Belarussian Public Broadcaster, where the interviews before the broadcasting were edited in sucha way that their quotes reflected the outlets editorial policy and the Belarussian states foreign policy, and not what was said.
In the days leading to Lithuania's 2024 presidential elections, a foreign information manipulation and interference (hereinafter – FIMI) incident developed, which was initiated and coordinated by the Belarus-related entities. The presumed effect of the FIMI incident was to possibly discredit some of the candidates, and discourage Lithuanian voters from participating in the election by presenting the election as meaningless whilst referring to Lithuania as a puppet of the West.
Interviews with candidates for Lithuanian president aired on May 6 and May 7 on the Belarus-1 TV show ‘Inside Out: Puppets’ (Russ. ‘Изнанка: Марионетки’) – in the same week when the first round of voting in the presidential election is scheduled.
Information manipulation involved the creation of false persona, including posing as a journalist from Russian and English reputable outlet Meduza. Through deceptive tactics, at least one running candidate and one former candidate – Giedrimas Jeglinskas and Arūnas Rimkus accordingly – were lured into online interviews, allowing their words to be manipulated to fit well-known pro-Russian and anti-Western narratives.
Just before the elections on May 12th, in the period May 6-11th, around 30 pieces of disinformation were published originating from the deceptive interviews of the candidates, highlighting the timing, intentionality and severity of this operation.
Debunk.ORG’s initial investigation has found that the planning of the influence operation started a month before the actual broadcast when the email address <meduzaolha@gmail.com> was created on April 8 to approach the candidate’s team. Debunk.ORG team used ABCDE framework and DISARM TTPs to describe the FIMI operation and the efforts behind it, highlighting Belarussian approach.
A - ACTOR
Within the intricate web of state-driven propaganda, the National State TV and Radio Company of the Republic of Belarus, colloquially known as Belteleradiocompany, emerges as a significant actor. Through its flagship Belarus 1 TV channel, it becomes a conduit for disseminating narratives, including those crafted to undermine political processes abroad. Ekaterina Tikhomirova, a prominent host within this media landscape, assumes a pivotal role in orchestrating disinformation campaigns, notably targeting Lithuania’s presidential hopefuls Giedrimas Jeglinskas, Arūnas Rimkus, and others. This chapter explores the intricate dynamics and implications of these actors' involvement in shaping political narratives. Therefore, three key actors could be observed when it comes to understanding who was potentially behind the disinformation campaign against Lithuania’s presidential candidates, Giedrimas Jeglinskas and Arūnas Rimkus. As the analysis below will show, three subjects have been identified that work in collaboration:
The Belarusian state (with all its accompanying governmental institutions) ensures the creation of a medium which provides necessary resources to create disinformation.;
The TV channel “Belarus-1” acts as a medium through which disinformation can be spread and presented.;
The journalist Ekaterina Tikhomirovna, who acts as the ultimate arbiter of truth, selectively shaping narratives to serve the state's and the channel’s agenda.
Tikhomirova joined Belarus-1, a state-owned Belarusian TV channel with a significant online presence and a key role in disseminating news to Belarusian citizens both domestically and internationally. Belarus-1 is known for its regime-hailing news reports, for example, portraying Alexander Lukashenko's regime as an ultimate success story rather than a repressive dictatorship.
As the levels of disinformation coming from a state-run channel increased over the years, the channel fell under the radar of many pro-Western journalists, independent analysts and democracy-focused (and later exiled) non-governmental organisations that continuously fought against the propaganda of Belarus-1 from offices across different European capitals. Various well-documented media investigations show that the Belarus-1 is often publishing fabricated reports that target the Belarusian opposition, Baltic states, Poland, and anyone who opposes the ideals of the "Russian world". Therefore, the channel could be described as an avid facilitator of the Belarus-Russia axis, especially, when it comes to promoting geopolitical campaigns of these two nations. For example, to demonise the European Union in the eyes of the Belarusian citizens, the channel labels the EU as an organisation that aids in helping to kidnap Ukrainian children by homosexual individuals and then selling their organs on the black market. At the same time, NATO is being portrayed as an aggressive alliance and as a product of “the big lie” that puts the whole world at the risk of global war. Summarising the facts regarding Tikhomirova, her ideological stance, and the inner workings of “Belarus-1”, it becomes clear that Tikhomirova is highly unlikely the sole mastermind behind a deliberate plan to conduct a fake interview with Giedrimas Jeglinskas and present the candidate and the whole country of Lithuania as an object under full control of the United States and its foreign policy goals.
Notably, this is not the first time Belarus-1 journalist Tikhomirova has used deceptive and manipulative methods to arrange interviews with prominent political figures. Similar stories have been recorded in the past when Tikhomirova targeted Belarusian opposition activists, among other things redressing and using makeup (e.g., wig, false nose) to look like a legitimate person and trick interviewee into the information manipulation scheme.
Ekaterina Tikhomirova quote from interview on sb[.]by on 30th of November 2023:
“Putting on a mask of another person is not easy. Plus the complex make-up. It took more than four hours: the wig, the false nose, the chin. In addition, on the psychological side, I had to understand: who is this woman? What does she want to look like? To study her, to review gigabytes of materials and her interviews. Over two months, my team began to warm up this lady and her interest, and did it very successfully: she was very much looking forward to meeting the "assistant"
State-owned TV channel Belarus-1 is fully financed by the Belarusian state and is fully dependent on Lukashenko’s regime. Owned by the National State Television and Radio Company of the Republic of Belarus (also known as Belteleradio), Belarus-1 is righteously deemed to be the epitome of disinformation and state propaganda. Hence, to curb the increasingly dangerous attempts of Belarus-1 to skew public perception both within Belarus and abroad, on June 3rd, 2022, a decision was taken by the European Council to sanction Belteleradio. In the following months, national sanctions of Switzerland, Germany, France, Canada, Ukraine, Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, and Italy were also applied.
The reason for Beltelradio’s sanctioning is the fact that in August 2020, in the aftermath of Belarus’ fraudulent presidential elections, Belteleradio dismissed protesting workers of the media outlets it controls and replaced them with Russian media employees, thus hindering further repression of civil society and removing the right for free and transparent media. However, this was not the first time the name of Beltelradio was mentioned in lists that enforce restrictions on engaging in financial markets and services across the Western world. Having direct links to Belteleradio through his position as Chairman of the Management Board, Ivan Mikhaylavich Eysmant on December 17th, 2020, was sanctioned by the EU. After that, many more national sanctions have followed, putting him on the list of individuals who were involved in repressions of civil society in Belarus and intimidation of peaceful demonstrators, opposition members, and journalists.
Now, to understand why Belteleradio (and the structures governing it) have such control over the political landscape in the country, it is important to start by analysing key points listed in the Decree of the President of the Republic of Belarus (2003-04-24 No. 174).
The following key points can be outlined that directly govern the kind of information received by the Belarusian public:
"Activities of political parties and other public associations with political aims and their organisational structures are not allowed in the National State Television and Radio Company of the Republic of Belarus."
"The main tasks of Belteleradio are the coverage of state domestic and foreign policy through television and radio broadcasting in order to ensure the political and economic stability of the country, its security, and territorial integrity."
"In accordance with its main tasks, Belteleradio performs the function of providing full and prompt coverage of the life of the Republic, its domestic and foreign policy, contributes to the formation of public thought, and propagates the ideas of humanism, democracy, and respect for human rights."
When it comes to the process of governance, the following points can be outlined:
“Beltelradio is headed by the Chairman.”
"The Chairman of Beltelradio manages the activities of Beltelradio and bears personal responsibility for the fulfilment of the tasks and functions assigned to it."
"The Chairman of Beltelradio is appointed and dismissed by the President of the Republic of Belarus."
"Approves the structure and regulations of the Beltelradio Company."
"Hires and dismisses employees of the Beltelradio Company, concludes contracts with them in accordance with the legislation <...>."
"For effective international activities, foreign representative offices (correspondent offices) may be established by decision of the Board of Beltelradio <...>, which "<...> has a representative office in the Russian Federation (Moscow)."
Now, when we delve into the key statutes outlined above, we can get a clearer picture of how Belarus-1 operates. At Beltelradio, the Chairman, Ivan Mikhaylavich Eysmant, is handpicked by President Lukashenko, indicating a direct alignment with the government's agenda. This means that Eysmant's decisions likely mirror the interests of the regime.
Furthermore, employees like Tikhomirova operate within a hierarchical system where decisions are closely monitored and influenced by higher-ranking officials, including Eysmant and potentially Lukashenko himself. While Tikhomirova's actions are subject to the regime's control, ensuring that Beltelradio's activities remain in line with government directives, her own ideological stance often fuels the dissemination of disinformation and anti-Western rhetoric, aligning perfectly with the regime's narrative.
Therefore, it could be claimed that the centralised control of Belarus-1 contrasts starkly with media organisations in democratic countries, where editorial independence is typically safeguarded and cherished.
B - BEHAVIOUR
Using the DISARM framework, the Debunk.ORG team was able to identify at least 11 of techniques, tactics and procedures (TTPs) that were used to execute FIMI activities. It should be noted, however, that the list of TTPs is not exhaustive, and that additional methods falling outside the scope of open-source investigation might have been used by the Belarusian actors to interfere into the 2024 Lithuanian Presidential Election.
T0097 "Create personas"
T0128.001 "Use Pseudonyms"
T0119 "Cross-Posting"
Upon further analysis, it was determined that the tactic of creating the false persona and the use of pseudonyms was used to lure Jeglinskas and Rimkus into giving interviews. Either Tikhomirova or the supporting team had created a false identity of a journalist named Olha who supposedly works at Meduza, a Russian- and English-language independent news website headquartered in Riga, Latvia. The Impersonator journalist initially contacted Lithuanian presidential candidates via email, presenting herself as “Olga from Meduza,” and expressing interest in making a piece on the prospects of democracy in Russia. During the analysis, it was also determined that the identity of the supposed journalist was coded into the Gmail email, as was the name of the outlet. However, the last name of the supposed “Olga the journalist” was not indicated, which should have been a red flag for candidates not to accept the interview proposal.. It is also crucial to mention that a short check-up on the official site of Meduza could have prevented candidates' communications department from ultimately falling victim to Tikhomirova’s plan. According to information posted on Meduza's website, the team in Riga consists of five individuals, and none of them go under the name “Olha”. Another significant red flag involves the use of a “Gmail'' service provider. While it's common for private individuals to use email addresses ending with “@gmail.com”, officially employed journalists usually correspond with potential interviewees using email accounts associated with their organisation. In this case, had the journalist actually been working at Meduza, the email should have mirrored the addresses indicated on the website, possibly containing the name of the private provider such as @meduza.io.
T0090 "Create Inauthentic Accounts"
Debunk.ORG’s initial investigation has revealed that the planning of the influence operation began a month before the actual broadcast, with the creation of the fake email address meduzaolha@gmail[.]com on April 8 at 14:11:08 (UTC).
The first email to approach Jeglinskas’ team was sent approximately four hours later.
Time and date of first contact: 2024-04-08 17:19
The first email to approach Rimkus’ team was sent shortly after contacting Jeglinskas’ team:
Time and date of first contact: 2024-04-08 17:28
It is also important to mention that according to obtained email conversations a set of 10 preliminary questions was sent to both Jeglinskas’ and Rimkus’ team.
The first email to approach Dainius Zalimas team was sent shortly after:
Time and date of first contact: 2024-04-08 17:49
Zalimas team did not respond to the inquiry.
Current Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda, also candidate in elections team responded to Debunk.ORG inquiry and informed they didn't receive inquiry from meduzaolha@gmail[.]com
The following questions were presented to communication teams of the running candidate Jeglinskas and the former candidate Rimkus:
Please tell us about yourself, your political activities, and the reasons why you decided to run for the presidency of Lithuania.
What are the pros and cons of the electoral process in Lithuania?
Who do you think will become the President of Lithuania?
How would you evaluate the policies of the incumbent president and the government of Lithuania? What strategic decisions would you make if you were elected as the head of state?
What advantages and disadvantages can you point out in Lithuania?
Russia held presidential elections in 2024. How do you assess their results?
What are your thoughts on relations with Russia and Belarus? How do you feel about Putin and Lukashenko? If you were to become president, what kind of relations would you aim to have with these countries?
What is your opinion on Lithuania's sanctions policy towards Russia and Belarus?
What is the place and role of the NATO bloc in the war between Ukraine and Russia?
What are your thoughts on the elections in the United States? Who do you think will win?
In this particular case, a so-called sockpuppet account was created using a widely recognized sequence of words to initiate the contact and send the preliminary questions. The email used the name of the journalist “Olha” and subsequently mentioned the outlet “Meduza.” However, as previously mentioned, the validity of the email account should have been cross-referenced with information found on the official Meduza website.
T0065 "Prepare Physical Broadcast Capabilities"
Based on copies of email conversations between Jeglisnkas and Tikhomirova, a Zoom account was set up (based on the modus operandi of the perpetrator, it could be presumed that a fake one was created containing similar wording seen in the email address of the journalist) to conduct the interview. The link to join the Zoom session was sent an hour before the actual interview. At this point, the attempt to organise the fake interview is going as planned. The lack of detailed information in the invitation to join the Zoom session is well observed and most probably could not have raised additional red flags to those on candidates communications teams. The link appears to be typical of a Zoom session, and the informal naming of the virtual call room, such as “Zoom Meeting Olga,” is often observed in these types of situations.
C – CONTENT
T0023 "Distort facts"
T0083 "Integrate Target Audience Vulnerabilities into Narrative"
T0118 "Amplify Existing Narrative"
When analysing the interviews, it is important to mention that Jeglinskas' appearance on Tikhomirova’s news show should be classified as heavily manipulated. Bits and pieces of the recorded interview were meticulously edited out and fitted in a way that suits the supposed interview questions. The content was crafted to align with anti-Lithuanian and anti-US disinformation narratives. These narratives are not new and could be observed in disinformation attacks prior to the 2024 Lithuanian Presidential elections. Based on the video, two key recycled narratives were being attempted to be reintroduced into the public sphere of both Belarusian and Lithuanian viewers.
The first narrative suggests that Lithuania has been declining ever since it joined the EU and is showing signs of being a "vassal" state. This narrative portrays a distorted image of Lithuania, especially focusing on the supposedly "prosperous" Soviet era, during which Lithuania appeared to possess key signs of a strong economy and industry. The narrative continues with the idea that, post-EU accession, Lithuania has become "nothing more than a US vassal" that lost its sovereignty and became a "backdoor of Europe." It also implies that Lithuania's voice within the bloc of EU countries is negligible and not taken seriously on the global arena.
The second narrative distorts the Russia-Ukraine conflict, claiming it's not between the two nations but between NATO and Russia, portraying NATO as the aggressor and Russia as the victim. This narrative alleges that NATO's support for Ukraine is a guise for expansionism, framing the alliance's actions as encircling Russia. It claims Russia has the right to defend itself against Western aggression, citing NATO's expansion into former Soviet bloc countries as justification. However, it is important to mention that this narrative completely ignores key facts, such as Russia's annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in Eastern Ukraine. It also overlooks Russia's violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and its continued military presence in Eastern parts of Ukraine.
T0023.001 "Reframe Context"
T0087.002 "Deceptively Edit Video (Cheap fakes)"
Other crucial tactics were also used to fit the obtained interview recordings into the existing narratives and the overall sentiment of the news bulletin hosted by Tikhomirova. The modus operandi of “Belarus-1” editorial staff involves changing, twisting, and exaggerating existing facts with hopes to construct a set of narratives that differ from reality. This can be done through the use of images and placing them at precise moments within the news bulletin to exacerbate the biggest effect on the viewer. For example, the news bulletin in question clearly states that Lithuania and Poland are supposedly conducting the policy of “selective immigration” by murdering illegal migrants right at their respective borders. The news clip includes unrelated video edits of corpses and the supposed handling of corpses by Belarusian institutions on Lithuania’s border.
The interview is also full of examples of tactic reframing. The editorial staff of the Belarus-1 purposely removed some of the interview recording from its surrounding context to distort the intended meaning. Additionally, the ideas expressed by Jeglinskas during the interview were clearly reframed in a way that may lead the target audiences of Belarus and Lithuania to draw a false conclusion about Jeglinskas’ intentions.
In fact, the following narratives can be observed in the news report:
Jeglinskas is portrayed as an American puppet, prioritising US interests over Lithuania’s.
Lithuania and its allies are deemed unprepared to defend the Suwalki corridor; cooperation among Lithuania, Poland, and the US is ineffective.
Lithuania's society is depicted as plagued by "cancerous" wounds, with the highest rates of alcoholism, suicide, and emigration.
Lithuania is accused of displaying aggressive behaviour; an edited clip of Jeglinskas' interview suggests readiness for confrontation with Russia.
The US is accused of transforming Lithuania into a militarised vassal state, resulting in a decline in industry and population.
T0072.001 "Geographic Segmentation"
The interviews were AI translated and used to geographically segment target audiences. This tactic is observed through the dissemination of the recorded interview in two languages – Russian and Lithuanian. While both interviews were conducted in Russian, the interviews were later dubbed into Lithuanian and posted on Belarus-1’s YouTube channel.
AI-translated Lithuanian versions of recordings with both G. Jeglinskas and A. Rimkus:
Title: “Diktatūros pliusai | Savicenzūra Vakaruose. Pokalbis su buvusiu kandidatu į Lietuvos prezidentus”.
Metrics: 1,198 views
Publishing date: May 8th, 2024
Description in Lithuanian:Kas pavogė rinkimus iš lietuvių? Nausėdos manevras: ką jis žadėjo ir kaip apgavo savo rinkėjus?
"Diktatūra" Lietuvos "demokratijos" pavydui - numuškime propagandines klišes, ką iš tikrųjų galvoja apie Baltarusiją. Interviu su Lietuvos politikais prezidento rinkimų išvakarėse.
Description in English:
Who stole the election from the Lithuanians? Nausėda's manoeuvre: what did he promise and how did he deceive his voters?
A "dictatorship" for the envy of Lithuanian "democracy" - let's knock down the propaganda clichés about what they really think about Belarus. Interviews with Lithuanian politicians on the eve of the presidential elections.
Title: “Kieno kare žaidžia Zelenskis? Interviu su kandidatu į Lietuvos prezidentus. Vidinė pusė.”
Metrics: 7,514 views
Publishing date: May 8th, 2024
Description in Lithuanian:
Daugiau nei 30 metų taip vadinamos „nepriklausomybės“ – Lietuva iš kadaise buvusios didžios šalies vitrinos tapo kilimėliu prie durų NATO.
Prie vairo stovi apmokytos marionetės. Vietoje ekonominės paramos militarizacija ir transformacija į karinį placdarmą. Apsivalymo tendencija - dėl Amerikos didybės. Interviu su kandidatais į Lietuvos prezidentus tęsinį žiūrėkite IŠKARTO DABAR.
Description in English:
More than 30 years of so-called "independence" - Lithuania has gone from being a showcase for a once great country to a doormat for NATO.
Trained puppets are at the helm. Instead of economic support, militarisation and transformation into a military beachhead. The cleansing trend is about American greatness. For the continuation of the interviews with the Lithuanian presidential candidates, see RIGHT NOW.
The idea behind such a tactic is to reach audiences that do not speak Russian. However, dubbing was not done professionally, and less effective measures, such as AI-generated voiceover, were used. It is not entirely known how persuasive such a voiceover is, as it contains clearly identifiable grammar mistakes and the voice of the narrator can clearly be labelled as too robotic and unnatural. The video descriptions were also translated, however, even there, translations are not accurate and mistakes can be easily identified by an untrained eye.
D - DEGREE
Here is an example of how the FIMI / disinformation campaign against Jeglinskas and Rimkus by “Belarus-1” could be deemed as “systematic” as it is posted across platforms and has the same goal of bringing the false narrative to as many people as possible:
Dissemination of the manipulated interview with G. Jeglinskas:
Date/Time | Name | Channel name | Platform | Views | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
7. May 2024. | В чью войну играет Зеленский? Интервью с кандидатом в президенты Литвы. Изнанка | АТН: новости Беларуси и мира | YouTube | 74,999 views | |
7. May 2024. | В чью войну играет Зеленский? Интервью с кандидатом в президенты Литвы. Изнанка | БТ| Беларусь 1: новости и эксклюзив | Dzen | 69 views | |
7. May 2024. | В чью войну играет Зеленский? Интервью с кандидатом в президенты Литвы. Изнанка | Беларусь 1: новости и эксклюзив | Rutube | 102 views | |
7. May 2024. | В чью войну играет Зеленский? Интервью с экс-кандидатом в президенты Литвы | / | |||
7. May 2024, 20:48 | 🤷🏻♀️Более 30 лет так называемой "независимости" — Литва из витрины некогда большой страны превратилась в коврик у дверей НАТО. | ATN_NEWS | Telegram | 1850 views | |
7. May 2024, 22:33 | ATN_NEWS | Telegram | 1898 views | ||
7. May 2024, 21:33 | ATN_NEWS | Telegram | 12391 views | ||
7. May 2024, 20:55 | ATN_NEWS | Telegram | 1301 views | ||
7. May 2024, 20:48 | ❗️🤷🏻♀️Более 30 лет так называемой "независимости" — Литва из витрины некогда большой страны превратилась в коврик у дверей НАТО. | ATN_NEWS | Telegram | 1850 views | |
7. May 2024, 09:54 | 🔥❌ Литва после 33 лет обретения так называемой независимости превратилась в коврик у дверей НАТО, а понятие "демократия" — только буквы в программных бюллетенях кандидатов в президенты 2024 года. | ATN_NEWS | Telegram | 1664 views | |
7. May 2024, 21:13 | ❗️🤷🏻♀️Более 30 лет так называемой "независимости" — Литва из витрины некогда большой страны превратилась в коврик у дверей НАТО. | Екатерина Тихомирова | Telegram | 79 views | |
8. May 2024, 13:28 | ATN_NEWS | Telegram | 1331 views | ||
8. May 2024, 15:43 | ATN_NEWS | Telegram | 1151 views | ||
11. May 2024. | «Изнанка» на «Беларусь 1»: откровения литовских кандидатов и экс-кандидатов в президенты | / |
Dissemination of the manipulated interview with A. Rimkus:
Date | Name | Channel name | Platform | Views | Link |
6. May 2024. | Плюсы диктатуры | Самоцензура на Западе. Интервью с экс-кандидатом в президенты Литвы. Изнанка | АТН: новости Беларуси и мира | YouTube | 22,277 views | |
, 22:07 | 🔥🔥🔥Кто украл у литовцев выборы? | / | |||
, 22:05 | 🔥🔥🔥Кто украл у литовцев выборы? ➡️https://youtu.be/vlifoTr9GLI | АТН: Новости Беларуси и мира | / | ||
6. May 2024. | Плюсы диктатуры | Самоцензура на Западе. Интервью с экс-кандидатом в президенты Литвы. Изнанка | БТ| Беларусь 1: новости и эксклюзив | Дзен | Беларусь 1: новости и эксклюзив | 130 views | ||
6. May 2024. | Экс-кандидат в президенты Литвы: умный правитель всегда думает о своей стране | / | |||
6. May 2024, 21:19 | Екатерина Тихомирова | Telegram | 87 views | ||
6. May 2024, 22:33 | ATN_NEWS | Telegram | 1676 views | ||
6. May 2024, 21:58 | ‼️🤔Есть ли в Литве цензура? | ATN_NEWS | Telegram | 1290 views | |
6. May 2024, 21:18 | ATN_NEWS | Telegram | 1441 views | ||
7. May 2024, 10:33 | ‼️🇱🇹Попасть к врачу теперь становится проблемой. | ATN_NEWS | Telegram | 1430 views | |
7. May 2024, 12:28 | 🔥НАУСЕДА — ПОПУЛИСТ! Много обещал, ничего не выполнил! | ATN_NEWS | Telegram | 1481 views | |
7. May 2024, 18:01 | ‼️ А в Литве на финишной прямой президентская кампания. Победу пророчат Науседе, хотя, если честно, её почему-то больше пророчат литовские госСМИ. Более-менее независимые источники в основном поливают этого гнусного человека грязью и считают, что второго круга он не достоин. | ЖС Premium | Telegram | 8193 views | |
7. May 2024, 18:34 | ‼️ А в Литве на финишной прямой президентская кампания. Победу пророчат Науседе, хотя, если честно, её почему-то больше пророчат литовские госСМИ. Более-менее независимые источники в основном поливают этого гнусного человека грязью и считают, что второго круга он не достоин. | Екатерина Тихомирова | Telegram | 79 views | |
7. May 2024. | Плюсы диктатуры | Самоцензура на Западе. Интервью с экс-кандидатом в президенты Литвы. Изнанка | Беларусь 1: новости и эксклюзив | 75 views | ||
7. May 2024. | 🇱🇹 ❓😱Кто украл у литовцев выборы? Манёвр Науседы: что обещал и как обманул своих избирателей? 💥"Диктатура" на зависть литовской "демократии" — собьём пропагандистские штампы, что на самом деле думают о Беларуси. Интервью с литовскими политиками накануне президентских выборов. 🔥Первая серия проекта "Изнанка" — прямо сейчас! #литва #Беларусь #ес #жизньзаграницей #диктатура #выборы #новости #правдажизни | Союз Славянских Ценностей | 246 views |
Key takeaways:
The disinformation campaign against Lithuania's presidential candidates, Jeglinskas and Rimkus, was possibly orchestrated by Ekaterina Tikhomirova, aided by Belarus-1, a state-owned media channel. Tikhomirova's actions served the interests of the Belarusian regime by portraying Lithuania as a puppet of the West, particularly the US, and by distorting facts to align with Russian interests.
The campaign involved creating false personas, using pseudonyms, and fabricating interviews. False identities posed as journalists to gain access to candidates, and interviews were deceptively edited to fit false narratives. Disinformation was spread across platforms and languages to maximise impact.
The campaign followed a systematic approach, with coordinated efforts across multiple channels and platforms. Identical narratives were used to target specific audiences, and content was translated to reach wider demographics.
Future recommendations for candidates and communication teams as countermeasures:
Robust Vetting Procedures: Implement thorough verification processes for interview requests, including cross-referencing email addresses and checking the authenticity of media outlets.
Vigilant Screening: Scrutinise interview requests rigorously, verifying email addresses against official sources, and scrutinising the content of requests.
Record given interview: When giving interviews, record them themselves to have evidence of what really was said.
Heightened Security Measures: Implement measures to verify identities of interviewers and secure communication channels.
Secure Communication Channels: Use encrypted communication tools and verify the identities of interviewers before sharing sensitive information.
Collaborate with countering FIMI / disinformation organisations: submit identified cases to countering disinformation organisations, if hard to identify, consult experts.