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Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI)

FIMI stands for foreign information manipulation and interference, the European Union's term for a kind of behaviour rather than for false content alone. The EU's diplomatic service, the EEAS, defines it in its threat reports as "a mostly non-illegal pattern of behaviour that threatens or has the potential to negatively impact values, procedures and political processes. Such activity is manipulative in character and is conducted in an intentional and coordinated manner, by state or non-state actors, including their proxies inside and outside of their own territory".

 

Debunk.org investigates such operations. In the Doppelganger journalist case (May 2024), a Lithuanian presidential candidate and a former candidate "were lured into online interviews, allowing their words to be manipulated to fit well-known pro-Russian and anti-Western narratives", and the interviews aired on Belarusian state TV in election week.

 

In our investigation of the Sprinter network on X (May 2025), shared content with a Belarusian Telegram channel pointed, in the report's words, "to the potential involvement of Belarusian state actors".

 

What makes something FIMI

 

FIMI combines three features. The actor behind it is foreign. The activity is manipulative, relying on deception such as fake identities, hidden sponsors or fabricated evidence; the EEAS notes that the assets involved "are deceptive by nature, hiding their operators and funding". And it is intentional and coordinated rather than one person's mistake.

 

FIMI can use true content. A foreign state amplifying a genuine news story through networks of fake accounts is FIMI even if the story is accurate, while a domestic group knowingly spreading a false claim is disinformation but not FIMI. Much of FIMI breaks no law, which the EEAS reflects in the words "mostly non-illegal". The related terms are set out in our guide to disinformation vs misinformation.

 

The EEAS's 2021 activity report described FIMI as "a pattern of behaviour", and the EU's Strategic Compass (March 2022) committed to "a dedicated toolbox to address foreign information manipulation and interference". The current definition, with "mostly non-illegal", appears in the EEAS's first threat report (February 2023) and its fourth (March 2026).

 

Who is behind FIMI

 

In 2025 the EEAS detected and analysed 540 FIMI incidents involving 10,500 channels, according to its fourth threat report. It attributed 29% to Russia and 6% to China; the remaining 65% were unattributed but showed "indicators of coordination with FIMI assets linked to Russian or Chinese attributed infrastructures". Ukraine remained the main target, followed by France, Moldova and Germany, and more than 100 countries were targeted in total.

 

The report is clear about its limits: "As the EEAS does not cover all regions or languages, this report reflects only a limited portion of threat actors' activities."

 

How FIMI works

 

The same techniques recur across operations, as the examples below show.

 

Copying real media: cloned news sites (Doppelganger) and a fake journalist posing as a Meduza reporter (our Doppelganger journalist case).

 

Mass relaying: sites that produce no original content but "massively relay publications" from pro-Russian sources (Portal Kombat, also known as the Pravda network).

 

AI content: synthetic articles, images and cloned voices (some posts in the Sprinter network, found to be AI-generated in Pangram Labs' screening).

 

Flooding verifiers: fakes sent to fact-checkers and newsrooms (Operation Overload).

 

In 2025, according to the EEAS, "one in four detected incidents by the EEAS involved the use of AI tools to produce or distribute content", and "many FIMI incidents involved the impersonation of Western news outlets".

 

Well-documented operations

 

Two operations are well documented by official bodies. France's agency VIGINUM described Portal Kombat, also known as the Pravda network, as at least 193 sites that "do not produce any original content but massively relay publications from sources that are primarily three types: social media accounts of Russian or pro-Russian actors, Russian news agencies, and official websites of local institutions or actors".

 

Doppelganger cloned real news websites. The EU sanctioned the Social Design Agency and Structura in July 2023 over a campaign it calls "RRN", and the US did so in March 2024 over networks of fake news sites. The UK sanctioned them in October 2024 as responsible for the network "commonly known as Doppelganger".

 

The FIMI-ISAC network's case studies from the 2024 European elections, which we summarised, found AI-generated content, impersonation of legitimate entities and inauthentic websites among the tactics used.

 

How analysts examine FIMI

 

Analysts structure a case with the ABCDE framework (actor, behaviour, content, degree, effect), name tactics with the DISARM framework and share data in the STIX format. In May 2023 the EU and the US agreed on a common standard for analysing FIMI that is "comprised of the DISARM framework, the STIX standard and the OpenCTI platform", according to the EEAS. Debunk.org applies these frameworks in its own investigations.

 

FIMI 101 is a 10-hour, self-paced online course with the skills and practical tools to recognise, analyse and counter FIMI campaigns. Start FIMI 101 →

 

How the EU responds

 

The EU's response rests on a "FIMI Toolbox". The EEAS's third threat report (March 2025) describes it as "a catalogue of instruments, many of which are in constant implementation, to tackle and respond to FIMI operations"; its fourth (March 2026) lists "sanctions, law enforcement, digital regulation and resilience-building" among those instruments.

 

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