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or misinformation, and 1710 of which contain factual information. Only a small share of the analyzed articles shared misinformation, originating predominantly from social media. Media sources by reach In the analyzed period, the most prevalent disinformation technique was ‘forgery The disinformation article with the largest social interaction is a piece from Infowars, titled “Rhode

distributed by online media in Montenegro and Serbia. to Covid-19 were also Serbian media sources, together conveying 48,4% of all detected misinformation Total reach of all mis/disinformation about Covid-19 detected by DebunkEU.org in online media in Montenegro by misinformation was drastically larger than by disinformation. More than 75% of Covid-19 misinformation or disinformation detected was distributed by Serbian media

information covering the elections were baltnews.com (8.9%), controlled by the Russian government's media However, none of the credible media channels reported on this case. False and misleading information in digital media and social media tended to focus more on elections It suggests that the pro-Kremlin media and other harmful disinformation actors have a modest interest Seemingly, the pro-Kremlin media is more interested in covering the events provoking greater resonance

WHAT KREMLIN PROPAGANDISTS SAY: One claim often made by pro-Kremlin media outlets is that ‘the mass media critical of Putin’s regime.[1] This narrative is often presented in direct contrast with the Western media Here’s some evidence: “Our media, journalists and outlets report from the epicenters of world events, adjusted picture of the world,” having reached an “ideological dead end.”[2] THE REALITY: The mass media and 11/60 for “civil liberties”.[3] In their report, Freedom House described the state of the mass media

Develop AI-Generated Images (Deepfakes)T0087.001: Develop AI-Generated Videos (Deepfakes) TA15: Establish Social Accounts T0090.004: Create Sockpuppet Accounts T0092: Build Network TA09: Deliver Content: T0114.001: Social DEGREE The accounts seemingly amass great amounts of traction on the platform, with Meltwater, a social media tracking tool, reporting 6.06 million mentions and 4.62 million reposts annually. or harmful manipulated media, including deepfakes or edited content that misrepresents reality.

was caused by HIMARS strike - such claims will become the most repeated message that the pro-Kremlin media HIMARS rocket, seemingly confirming that the Russian side was quite well prepared for the onset of the disinformation In the official media, other claims included a message saying that Ukraine insisted that Azov fighters But perhaps the most interesting aspect of the disinformation campaign to spin the massacre of Ukrainian Pro-Russian Baltic Telegram environment Since TG as a social media is not very widely used in the Baltics

on social media. , such as shifts in the frequency of sharing misinformation or the usage of relevant hashtags. The intervention is a theory-driven social impact game developed in collaboration with the Dutch media There were a total of 16 fake social media posts, they were divided into two sets, each containing 4 "Breaking Harmony Square: A game that “inoculates” against political misinformation."

Disinformation is a multifaceted topic, and a spiral curriculum enables learners to revisit and deepen Disinformation often requires critical thinking and the interpretation of information, making constructivist exploration and reflection, a valuable strategy for developing skills in analyzing and understanding disinformation in the course would provide opportunities for learners to reflect on their evolving thoughts about disinformation and media literacy.

Moreover, pro-Kremlin media have once again attacked the reputation of the Lithuanian President Gitanas Pro-Kremlin media makes use of events to promote disinformation narratives In the middle of June, a message Out of false content pieces, disinformation constituted 84.62% while misinformation – 15.38% (82.84% outlets, and hostile activity on social media. Articles published by the pro-Kremlin media sources covered the largest scope of the analysed data.

Attention of Kremlin related media also fell on statements made during the meeting of NATO Ministers In February 2021, Debunk EU detected 7027 articles related to NATO, which were posted by hostile media with potentially harmful content, identifying 710 articles with false and misleading content from 84 media In terms of distribution by media sources, ria.ru, rambler.ru and lenta.ru stood out in the audiences In terms of unique content published, state-funded outlets such as Sputnik media group and RT, along

community were issued about the progress made regarding the safety of Belarusian NPP, the pro-Kremlin media Out of false content pieces, disinformation constituted 90.6% while misinformation – 9.4% of the articles that were published by the Kremlin-funded (or affiliated) media outlets, and hostile activity on social media. “Publication received a considerable attention in pro-Kremlin media which presented these statements

Pro-Kremlin media is also heavily involved. Meanwhile, Russian media portrayed the protests differently. Although there are frequent discussions about Kremlin-ordered disinformation, disseminated through Russian For this research, the analysts sought to cover different Russian media outlets (internet media, news agencies, TV channels, press and regional media).

In addition to harmful content spread through online media, disinformation finds its ways on social media Debunk EU detected 108 cases of disinformation (75.2%) and misinformation (24.8%) about COVID-19. Disinformation and misinformation regarding Covid-19 topic were found in 28 different Facebook groups Debunk EU detected that 92.7% of the disinformation and misinformation cases were posted in Lithuanian Zbigniew Martyka were shared broadly on different social media platforms.

Topics of the programs/initiatives Introduction to disinformation and social media, bots and trolls are seems to be a powerful tool in improving critical thinking and identifying manipulation techniques in social gamified approach to the inoculation theory to educate users on spotting manipulation techniques in social media posts and understanding the impact of disinformation on society. , such as the motivations behind online trolling or the mechanisms of social media manipulation.

months leading up to the 30th anniversary of the USSR dissolution, various Kremlin-related Russian media the legal successor of the USSR, the anniversary, in general, is covered widely by the pro-Kremlin media The analysis revealed how different actors are portrayed in the media as partially guilty of the USSR The third week of August 2021 was a significantly active month for pro-Kremlin media. Some focus on the consequences of the collapse stating that it led to harsh social inequalities or a

Throughout December 2020, Debunk EU tracked hostile media and carried out a two-dimensional analysis, misleading content in English, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish and Russian languages from 73 media refusals" to vaccinate, including in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, are being prepared in social various conspiracies may be an important source of belonging and shared reality, especially at a time of social looking for ways to force people get vaccinated via the exclusion of those refusing to get the jab from social

On February 1-28th 2021, Debunk EU detected 560 articles that were identified as disinformation or misinformation The leading distributors of disinformation in Lithuania – Kremlin’s funded information outlets sputniknews.ru Above-mentioned media outlets spread nearly two thirds (64.9%) of all detected ‘problematic information Russian prevails as the dominant language in disinformation cases concerning Lithuania. In February articles distributed by non-systemic Lithuanian media outlets tended to dominate by social

Through the synergy of three parts of the Russian media ecosystem analysed in this paper (official government institutions, television shows, and Telegram channels), the Kremlin can keep control of the media report can be accessed here: https://stratcomcoe.org/publications/war-on-all-fronts-how-the-kremlins-media-ecosystem-broadcasts-the-war-in-ukraine

Even though right after the election Russian media was quite critical towards Belarusian regime, after According to Debunk EU, compared to August, throughout September and October Russian media was eager Debunk EU analyses of the most popular Russian media outlets have shown that the Kremlin was not unambiguous In order to analyse communication trends in Russian media and the changing perception of the situation Kremlin, Debunk EU analysts have looked into 2396 articles on this topic, published in the Russian media

second unit of BelNPP without meeting the necessary nuclear safety requirements, the Kremlin-backed media status of the Belarusian NPP at the end of November received rather little attention in the pro-Kremlin media However, this was the only information that was disseminated in the Kremlin media. slightly, the pro-Kremlin media continued to spread false and misleading articles. Lithuanian representatives denying Gerus', this lie has taken on a life of its own in the pro-Kremlin media