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Ballots, Bots and Borders: Platforms and Foreign Influence in Brazil's 2026 Presidential Election

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16 min read

Brazil’s 2026 presidential election, won by incumbent Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in the 25 October runoff against Federal Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, was fought largely on social media and in the courts. Digital communications shaped it more than any before, and foreign actors played a more visible role than ever. Until now, disinformation in Brazilian elections was mainly seen as a domestic problem, driven by local political networks on platforms such as WhatsApp. In 2026, Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) entered the public debate, and voters, the press, and the courts discussed it openly. 

This report examines three issues that shaped the online information environment during the campaign: how Meta moderated and promoted content, the activity of foreign and foreign-linked actors, and a narrative about US interference that spread two days before the first round.

Meta was at the centre of the most serious clash between a technology company and Brazilian institutions. Lula’s campaign reported restrictions on its ads and reduced reach, and users showed Meta’s AI chatbot producing campaign images for one candidate but not the other. Meta attributed the issue to technical glitches. The dispute triggered proceedings before Brazil’s electoral court, drew scrutiny from US lawmakers and, after the election, prompted Brazil’s Supreme Court to order a police investigation into possible foreign interference through social media algorithms.

The Brazilian elections also saw FIMI incidents from a range of actors. La Derecha Diario, an Argentine outlet founded by a former adviser to President Javier Milei, spread a fabricated story about Moroccan migrants, followed by claims of electoral fraud. Echoing the Argentine government’s position, the outlet refused to recognise Lula’s victory, seeking to sway public opinion in both Brazil and Argentina. Meanwhile, Nova Resistência, a Brazilian group linked to Russian influence networks, threw its support behind a far-left candidate who was also promoted by Russian state media. Finally, the temporary closure of US diplomatic offices on 2 October fuelled around 50,000 posts claiming a US “psychological operation”, which were amplified by pro-Kremlin and Venezuelan state media accounts.


Key findings 

Meta’s platforms became a central part of the election dispute. Lula’s campaign reported that Meta had suspended its Facebook ad account in September and blocked its Instagram ads for nearly a day in October. Meta called both incidents technical errors. However, internal messages leaked to the Brazilian newspaper Folha de S.Paulo showed staff acknowledging that Meta had restricted Lula’s accounts. Meta’s AI chatbot on WhatsApp also generated campaign images for Flávio Bolsonaro but refused to do the same for Lula, a practice Brazilian electoral rules prohibit. 

An Argentine far-right outlet targeted the election from start to finish. La Derecha Diario, founded by a former adviser to Argentine President Javier Milei and to former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, spread a fabricated story about a wave of Moroccan migrants in southern Brazil. The story used a photo taken in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta and appeared in at least 13,400 posts. On runoff day, the outlet spread claims of fraud and called Lula a “dictator”, and it later refused to recognise his victory. Milei was the only South American leader who had not congratulated Lula at the time of reporting. After the vote, Flávio Bolsonaro left Brazil through Argentina despite a court order barring him from travelling, and a top Milei adviser met him at an Argentine airport, according to The New York Times. 

A group linked to Russian influence networks backed a far-left candidate. Nova Resistência, a Brazilian group that the US State Department linked in 2023 to a pro-Kremlin disinformation network, supported Rui Costa Pimenta of a small Trotskyist party. Russian state media promoted his statements, including claims that Brazil’s voting system was vulnerable. He received 0.01% of the vote.

A US interference narrative spread days before the first round. After the US Embassy temporarily closed its offices in Brazil, citing an online terrorist threat, around 50,000 posts claimed the closure was a US “psychological operation” to influence the vote. Brazil’s police and intelligence agency denied the unverified media report behind the claim. Pro-Kremlin accounts and a journalist at Venezuelan state television amplified it.


Context 

Brazil’s 2026 general elections were among the most polarised since the country’s return to democracy in 1985. Incumbent president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva became the first candidate to win the presidency after finishing second in the first round, in a race overshadowed by accusations of information manipulation, disputes over the role of digital platforms, and claims of foreign interference. The elections were held on 4 October 2026 to choose the president, the vice president, members of the National Congress, governors, and state legislative assemblies in all federative units. No presidential candidate won more than half of the valid votes in the first round, so a runoff was held on 25 October.

Federal Senator Flávio Bolsonaro (Liberal Party, PL, in Portuguese) won the first round with 47% of the vote to Lula’s 45%. In the runoff, Lula won with 51.79% of valid votes to Bolsonaro’s 48.21% and secured a fourth, non-consecutive term. Lula is a former metalworker and union leader who co-founded the Workers’ Party (PT). He was president from 2003 to 2010, was imprisoned in 2018 after a conviction that the Supreme Federal Court (STF) later annulled, and returned to the presidency in 2023 after defeating the far-right candidate and former president Jair Bolsonaro. 

Flávio Bolsonaro, Jair Bolsonaro’s eldest son, served four terms as a Rio de Janeiro state deputy before he was elected Federal Senator in 2018. He ran as the candidate of his father’s political movement because Jair Bolsonaro was barred from office and was convicted by the STF in 2025 for plotting a coup.

The 2026 presidential campaign was fought largely on social media and in the courts, where digital platforms quickly became a central issue. As the race tightened, Lula’s campaign accused Meta of using its recommendation algorithms to boost Flávio Bolsonaro’s reach while limiting its own. Bolsonaro’s campaign, on the other hand, accused Lula of coordinating supporters through WhatsApp channels to influence voters and spread disinformation - a claim that was later rejected, as Brazilian authorities found no evidence of disinformation in pro-Lula WhatsApp channels. 

Two days after the runoff, Supreme Federal Court justice Flávio Dino ordered the Federal Police to investigate possible foreign interference through the intentional use of algorithms to favour or harm candidates. One month later, Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court (TSE) fined Meta about 1.1 million euros for failing to comply with court orders after President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva alleged the tech giant tipped the scales toward his rival. 

These disputes occurred despite some of the most detailed rules on online campaigning in any democracy. TSE places strict obligations on digital platforms: paid electoral content must be clearly identified, platforms may not use their systems to favour or recommend any candidate, and they must act immediately to stop unlawful content from spreading, being boosted or earning money. If they fail to do so, the candidates who benefit can lose their registration or mandate. The same rules extend to artificial intelligence, requiring campaigns to clearly label any content created or significantly altered by AI, banning deepfakes and disinformation that could favour or harm a candidate, and prohibiting new AI-generated content from being published or promoted from 72 hours before the vote until 24 hours after it. 

The candidates’ first speeches after the runoff showed that the battle over Brazil’s online information landscape and the role of digital platforms would continue well beyond election day. In his victory speech, Lula effectively declared war on the digital platforms, saying his campaign had to overcome “interference coming from outside, through digital platforms” and promising to regulate them. Flávio Bolsonaro, by contrast, cast doubt on the integrity of the election itself. He refused to concede defeat, said he would ask for the result to be annulled and revived claims of electoral fraud.

Meta’s moderation under scrutiny: account restrictions and algorithmic bias claims

During the 2026 campaign, Meta was at the centre of the most serious clash between a technology platform and Brazilian institutions. The problems began even before the first round. On 24 September, 10 days before the vote, Lula’s campaign team reported that Meta had suspended the Facebook ad account of his re-election campaign, “Eleições 2026 Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva Presidente”, for about an hour and a half, preventing the campaign from sponsoring content. Meta later acknowledged the error on its website, stating that the account “was mistakenly disabled for a little over an hour after an ad was classified as potentially impersonating a government social program during a broader anti-fraud review. The official campaign’s Facebook Page and Instagram account were never blocked”, according to the big tech company.

A second incident followed shortly after the first round. Lula’s campaign accused Meta of preventing it from boosting Instagram ads for nearly 24 hours between 9 and 10 October, which, by the campaign’s estimate, kept its ads from about 1.3 million people. Lula’s party also complained that some of his posts appeared without a share button and with reduced reach.

An investigation published by Folha de S.Paulo revealed internal messages between Meta employees in which staff acknowledged that restrictions had harmed Lula's Instagram accounts and that the platform had algorithmically recommended Flávio Bolsonaro’s Instagram profile and WhatsApp channel, a practice prohibited by the Superior Electoral Court. In one message, an employee identified as Roberto wrote that Lula’s account was “limited” compared with Flávio’s, and warned that this was a problem given the “high chance” of legal action. 

On its website, Meta said that “on 9 October, Meta identified a global Ads Manager fault, caused by a code update, that temporarily prevented advertisers from creating ads from already published Instagram posts. Direct uploads from Ads Manager continued to work for creating new ads, and President Lula’s campaign was never prevented from boosting ads during this period. The incident impacted thousands of advertisers across different countries and ended after the code update was reverted early on 10 October. Ads already running by those advertisers, including President Lula’s campaign, were not affected. This was a technical event, not action directed at one specific political campaign”, wrote Meta.

Another incident involved Meta AI, the company’s WhatsApp chatbot. On 14 October, Brazilian users complained that it generated images supporting Bolsonaro’s campaign but refused to produce similar images for Lula. Brazilian electoral law prohibits platforms from recommending candidates or parties during the campaign and requires all candidates to be treated equally, under the principle of equal treatment known as isonomia. 

In one example, a user asked Meta AI to create images featuring the slogan “Lula 13”, but the tool declined. When prompted to create images with the slogan “Flávio 22”, it generated them. The numbers 13 and 22 are the candidates’ respective ballot numbers. 

As these complaints mounted, Lula’s campaign took the matter to the Superior Electoral Court, accusing Meta of using its algorithms and AI restrictions to favour Flávio Bolsonaro. 

Digital mobilisation, particularly on Meta’s platforms, was central to Lula’s runoff comeback. Much of the credit went to “Lula’s Army” (Exército do Lula), a WhatsApp channel led by Congressman André Janones, who had also coordinated Lula’s digital operation in 2022. The channel grew from about 55,000 followers after the first round to nearly 11 million by runoff day, sending supporters urgent daily “missions” to share campaign videos, push hashtags and recruit friends and family. Its rapid rise challenged the dominance that Bolsonaro-aligned networks had held over WhatsApp and Telegram since 2018. 

Prosecutors opened an investigation and gave Meta 24 hours to treat both candidates equally. The order barred the company from reducing the distribution of political content, restricting searches or removing posts in ways that created an imbalance, and it required Meta’s AI tool to apply the same criteria to both candidates, under a daily fine of 80,000 euros. 

The pressure on the company intensified in the final week of the campaign. On 21 October, Lula’s campaign announced a formal electoral investigation action against Meta and asked the electoral court to annul Flávios Bolsonaro’s candidacy. Meanwhile, the dispute spilt onto the streets, as hundreds of people protested outside Meta’s São Paulo office in demonstrations organised by the group Não Se Meta (“Stay Out of It”, in translation), and more than 100 civil society organisations, including Greenpeace International, Global Witness and Oxfam Brazil, urged the authorities to enforce the rules.

Bolsonaro’s campaign, for its part, also turned against the platform. On 16 October, it asked to join Lula’s case, arguing that Meta had allowed paid negative ads against Flávio Bolsonaro, including some paid for by Lula’s official page, which the Brazilian electoral rules prohibit. 

The controversy soon drew attention abroad, partly because of the Donald Trump government’s support for the Bolsonaro family and the US sanctions and tariffs against Brazil that had led Lula to accuse Washington of meddling. On 22 October, 12 members of the US House of Representatives and Senator Bernie Sanders wrote to Meta’s chief executive, Mark Zuckerberg, requesting an urgent briefing and asking, among other things, whether the company had communicated with Trump administration officials about Brazil’s judiciary or its elections.

Throughout the campaign, Meta maintained that the allegations were “false and unfounded” and blamed “technical incidents” that it said had affected different parts of the political spectrum.

Lula’s victory on 25 October did not end the dispute. Instead, it moved the issue to the centre of the post-election agenda. In his victory speech, Lula said he had to overcome “interference coming from outside, through digital platforms” and promised to regulate them. Two days later, Supreme Federal Court justice Flávio Dino ordered the Federal Police to investigate possible foreign interference through the intentional use of platform algorithms to favour or harm candidates.

One month after the runoff, on 10 November, Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court (TSE) unanimously ruled to fine Meta 7.5 million reais (around 1.1 million euros), finding that the company had missed deadlines and failed to provide transparency in its investigation.


Foreign actors and narratives in the battleground

La Derecha Diario and a far-right disinformation network

La Derecha Diario, an Argentine conservative and far-right political propaganda network operating in Latin America, targeted Brazil’s 2026 presidential election throughout the electoral cycle. But it was not the outlet’s first involvement in Brazilian politics. La Derecha Diario was founded by Fernando Cerimedo, an Argentine political consultant who led communications for Javier Milei’s 2023 presidential campaign, worked on former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s unsuccessful 2022 re-election campaign and advised the campaign of Bolivia’s current president, Rodrigo Paz. 


On 18 August 2026, Cerimedo was arrested in Bolivia, where prosecutors accused him of attempted femicide. Police searches of his properties found what prosecutors called a “bot farm”, a network of automated or fake accounts used to artificially amplify content, manipulate online engagement and spread messages across social media platforms. 


On 25 August, the sale of his 50% stake in La Derecha Diario to his partner, Spanish journalist Javier Negre, became official, and Negre now says Cerimedo has no link to the outlet.


At the start of the 2026 Brazilian election cycle, La Derecha Diario published a post claiming a surge in Moroccan immigrants arriving in the southern Brazilian state of Santa Catarina, blaming the Lula government’s immigration policy. The claim was false and appears to have been invented. No Brazilian media outlet reported such a surge, and the main image in the posts, which shows a crowd and a boat by the sea, was taken in Ceuta, a Spanish enclave in North Africa. 

Despite this, between 21 and 27 August, at least 13,400 posts on social media and websites mentioned the claim, according to the Brazilian fact-checking media organisation Agencia Lupa. About 11,000 were in Spanish and 2,000 in Portuguese, which indicates the story circulated mainly among Spanish-speaking audiences before reaching Brazil. 


La Derecha Diario’s activity peaked around the runoff on 25 October, when it spread claims of electoral fraud and began calling Lula a “dictator”. It began questioning the legitimacy of the second round before voting closed and stepped up its posting after Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court and the Electoral Court extended voting hours. The extension became its main argument that the vote was being manipulated in Lula’s favour. 



The outlet did not recognise Lula’s victory, echoing the Argentine government's position.  President Milei has not congratulated Lula or publicly recognised his victory. At the time of reporting, Milei was the only South American leader who had not congratulated Lula.

Days after the vote, Milei’s government also faced questions over the departure of Flávio Bolsonaro, the defeated candidate, who left Brazil through Argentina despite a court order barring him from leaving the country, and who was met at an Argentine airport by a top adviser to Milei, according to the NYT. 

Group linked to Russian influence networks backs far-left candidate 

One of Brazil’s best-known pro-Kremlin networks, repeatedly exposed by international organisations and first identified by the US State Department’s Global Engagement Center (GEC, which has since been shut down by the Donald Trump administration), was also active in the presidential campaign. Nova Resistência (New Resistance) is a quasi-paramilitary neo-fascist organisation operating in South America with close links to people and entities in Russia’s disinformation and propaganda ecosystem. It was set up by a pro-Kremlin disinformation and propaganda network and takes its inspiration from Aleksandr Dugin, a US-sanctioned Russian philosopher and the main advocate of an anti-Western, Russia-led Eurasian imperialist movement. The broader network, which the US Department of State called in 2023 the Syncretic Disinformation Network (SDN), actively promotes Dugin’s Fourth Political Theory (4PT). The theory aims to unite the far right and the hard left to bring down the post-Second World War order. Nova Resistência supports authoritarian regimes of both the left and the right, and advances the Kremlin’s goals of destabilising democracies and undermining the rules-based international order.

Nova Resistência publicly backed Rui Costa Pimenta in Brazil’s 2026 presidential election. Pimenta was the candidate for the Partido da Causa Operária (PCO), a small far-left Trotskyist partyhe co-founded and has led for decades. The two groups announced a joint candidacy and said it would strengthen the nationalist movement in Brazil.



Nova Resistência did not back Pimenta from the start. Earlier in the campaign, it promoted the pre-candidacy of Aldo Rebelo, a former communist congressman and minister who has since moved to nationalist positions. In July, Rebelo’s party, Democracia Cristã, dropped his candidacy. Nova Resistência then turned to the PCO.


Nova Resistência was founded in Rio de Janeiro in 2015. Its leader, Raphael Machado, is editor-in-chief of Ars Regia, which publishes Dugin’s books in Portuguese. The German television news service Tagesschau and the Gnida Project have named him as an operator of Storm-1516 in Germany and Hungary. Another member, Lucas Leiroz, has also been linked to Russian influence operations, including Storm-1516. 


Russian state media covered Pimenta’s candidacy and political platform. During the campaign, RT Brasil published short videos promoting his proposals and his views on geopolitics. These included interviews in which Pimenta gave his economic forecasts and spread disinformation and conspiracy theories. 


For instance, Pimenta said Brazil’s electoral system was vulnerable and questioned the integrity of the elections. In another interview, he said that “a very select group of people” - an economic elite - controls not only Brazil but the whole world. Before the election, Sputnik Brasil also amplified some of Pimenta’s statements. In one, he openly declared his support for Russia against NATO and criticised the Brazilian left for remaining neutral. Pimenta received 15,024 votes, or 0.01% of valid votes, in the first round on 4 October.


A US interference narrative 48 hours before the vote 

A narrative claiming that the United States was planning to interfere in Brazil’s presidential election spread on social media 48 hours before the first round on 4 October. Pro-Russian accounts and an account belonging to a Venezuelan state broadcaster TeleSUR English correspondent amplified it.


On Friday, 2 October, the US Embassy announced the suspension of consular services and public-facing operations, citing an “online threat of a terrorist attack against its facilities”. According to CNN Brazil, the online threat warned that US buildings in Brazil and those of “their English-speaking allies” would be attacked during the elections. However, Brazil’s intelligence agency, Abin, said it had issued no warning.

The suspension covered the embassy in the capital, Federal District, and the consulates in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Recife and Porto Alegre. The Australian Embassy also suspended consular services the same day. 



In the afternoon, Brazil’s Federal Police carried out two search-and-seizure operations, one in São Paulo and one near the capital. In a statement, the police said they were investigating the “alleged planning of acts that could put US diplomatic facilities in Brazil at risk”. They described the operations as a preventive measure carried out in cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies, but they found no evidence to confirm the initial risks and identified no suspects linked to criminal organisations. No arrests were reported.


Despite this, on the same day, the progressive outlet Revista Fórum published an “exclusive” report. Citing anonymous sources, it said Brazil’s intelligence system, Sisbin, had warned of a US-backed psyop, allegedly codenamed “Tio Sam II”, in reference to Operation Brother Sam, the US support plan for the 1964 coup in Brazil. The report said the operation aimed to spread fear before the vote. The Federal Police denied producing any such report. The fact-checking project Comprova found that both the Federal Police and Abin denied issuing any alert about a coup attempt. 


The “psyop” claim - Between 2 and 4 October, around 50,000 Portuguese-language posts on social media platforms claimed that the United States was running a “psychological operation” (psyop) and that the closures were part of it, according to data from Meltwater Explore. These posts generated nearly 1.2 million engagements.

One X account that amplified the narrative was @AnaliseGeopol. One of its posts claimed that the Brazilian Federal Police was investigating US interference in the presidential elections. At the time of analysis, the post had received 44,000 likes and 88,000 shares.



The X account had 76,000 followers at the time of analysis. The same outlet also runs accounts on Facebook (30,000 followers) and Instagram (106,000 followers). The accounts are linked to the website “analisegeopolitica.com”, which covers the Global South, BRICS and the “multipolar world”, which are all recurring themes in Kremlin messaging aimed at Latin American audiences, where they are used to promote anti-US sentiment.


The website describes itself as an independent media organisation, but it gives no information about its editorial team. Most of its articles cover the war in Ukraine. One describes a “NATO aggression” against Russia, and another accuses France and the United Kingdom of escalating the war. Other articles cover Russia’s military and energy capabilities, including the Vostok Oil project and Rosatom’s investments in nuclear reactors.



The domain was registered on 22 July 2026 through Hostinger, a company based in Lithuania. Its IP address belongs to Vercel, a US-based hosting provider.



Another account, @BrianMteleSUR, affiliated with the Venezuelan state media TeleSUR, also spread the narrative. His post, which received 1,400 likes and 323 shares, said: “Brazil's Intelligence Agency Abin issued a report today referring to the US Embassy closing in Brazil as a Trump administration Psyop.  A source told Forum magazine that US State Department officials are informally referring to it as "Operation Brother Sam II". 



Another account on X, @sitebricsbrasil, also amplified the narrative on 2 October. Without directly mentioning the US, the account posted:

“REFLECTION: The courage of the Brazilian people is the antidote to the fear that foreign forces are trying to impose on us on the eve of the presidential election. 👻 BEHIND THE SCENES: WHAT LIES BENEATH?

Do you know what a "psyop" is? The term comes from the prefix "psy", from psychological, and "ops", from "operations" – in other words, psychological operations. It is a well-known weapon used by foreign agents to manipulate minds, divide societies and undermine elections around the world.”

At the time of the analysis, the post had received 2,400 likes and nearly 900 reposts.

The X account is linked to a website, bricsbrasil.com.br, whose domain was registered in June 2024. The website publishes content about the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).


Conclusion

The 2026 election marked a turning point for Brazil’s information environment. Digital communications shaped the campaign more than in any previous election, and foreign actors were more visible than ever. Disinformation in Brazilian elections had long been treated as a domestic problem, spread mainly by local political networks on platforms such as WhatsApp. This time, Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) moved to the centre of the debate among voters.

The dispute over Meta was the best-known case and the only one that led to legal action. Lula’s campaign took the company to the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), and after the runoff, Supreme Federal Court justice Flávio Dino ordered the Federal Police to investigate possible foreign interference through platform algorithms. The case also drew attention abroad, including from members of the US Congress. 

The other cases reached smaller audiences and targeted mainly voters on the political fringes. La Derecha Diario’s fabricated story about Moroccan migrants, and its later fraud claims, circulated mostly among Spanish-speaking and far-right audiences. Nova Resistência’s backing of Rui Costa Pimenta, promoted by RT Brasil and Sputnik Brasil, had little electoral effect: Pimenta received 0.01% of valid votes.

The direct impact of these interference attempts on the result is difficult to measure, but they helped spread distrust in the electoral process. 

Brazil’s response relied mainly on legal and institutional tools. These included detailed TSE rules on platforms and AI, fast court orders backed by heavy fines, and judicial investigations into the role of algorithms. Investigative journalism and fact-checking also played an important role. Folha de S.Paulo’s reporting on Meta’s internal messages, together with quick debunks by Agência Lupa and Comprova and public denials from the Federal Police and Abin, limited the reach of several false claims.


They were less effective against cross-border networks such as La Derecha Diario and the pro-Kremlin ecosystem around Nova Resistência. Disrupting these networks will require closer international cooperation and more transparency from platforms.


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