top of page
Articles
Search


How to use AI safely: Lessons we learned testing 10 chatbots against disinformation
We tested ten widely used AI chatbots against ten disinformation narratives about Lithuania. We asked each of them, in Lithuanian, to argue the false claim and back it up with sources. Nearly half of the answers gave way. Many repeated the disinformation outright. Others wrapped it in a “both sides” frame that made it look like a legitimate debate. Even the answers that rejected the false claims often stood on shaky ground. They cited outlets aligned with the Russian state, l


Can AI Chatbots Resist Disinformation? LLM Disinformation Resilience Audit
Jovita Tautkevičiūtė-Kalinauskienė Laima Venclauskienė Algirdas Kazlauskas Ona Jurkevičiūtė Not long ago, almost everyone answered the question “Where do you go when you search for something online?” in the same way: Google. That is changing before our eyes. In 2025, almost 37% of adults in Lithuania, above the EU average, had used a generative AI tool in the previous three months. AI chatbots are entering everyday life faster than people are learning their pitfalls, and few


OPERATION OVERLOAD Part III: The Operation Grows Smarter
Debunk.org has been a confirmed target of Operation Overload since 2023. Our first report documented 120 emails received through that point, identified five thematic clusters, named Telegram as the dominant link destination, identified Gmail as the primary sending infrastructure, and noted a consistent correlation between email volume spikes and major EU-Ukraine geopolitical events. Our second report extended the dataset to nearly 350 emails and analysed more than 100 images


The Lithuania - Belarus Balloon Smuggling Crisis: A Disinformation Narrative Analysis
Since January 2025, Russian-language media have told and retold the story of a border crisis between Lithuania and Belarus – one triggered by smuggling balloons carrying cigarettes across the border, which repeatedly closed Vilnius Airport and put Lithuania on alert. This report looked at how that story was told: 1,566 articles from Russian-language outlets, reaching a combined audience potential of roughly 663 million contacts, over eighteen months. What we found is not a si


As the Stands on 9 May Thins, Kremlin Mouthpieces Pour Anger at the Baltic States
The principled decision by Lithuania and its Baltic neighbours to deny the Slovak leader’s flight through their airspace to the Victory Day commemoration in Moscow for the second year in a row has sparked a storm of reaction in pro-Kremlin media. According to our study, this year has once again seen the repetition of lies about the alleged desecration of Soviet soldiers’ graves, the persecution of Russian speakers, the rewriting of history, and the resurgence of Nazism not on


Attacks on Lithuanian Partisan Leaders Are Expanding – Kremlin Media Accuses Jonas Žemaitis and Juozas Lukša of Nazism
On 27 January, the world marks International Holocaust Remembrance Day — the day when the Auschwitz concentration camp was liberated 81 years ago. As in previous years, Kremlin-aligned media in 2025 intensified coverage of the highly sensitive topics of the Holocaust and antisemitism, exploiting them to justify an aggressively imperialist political agenda. Alongside recurring false claims that the Baltic states voluntarily sought to join the Soviet Union, the past year also s


Debunk.org Trusted Flagger 2025 report
Between April and December 2025, Debunk submitted 1,468 reports to Meta under its Trusted Flagger status. These reports led to the removal of 26,255 Facebook pages and approximately 5.9 million advertisements. The removed content was primarily associated with fraudulent e-commerce and investment schemes, illegal online gambling operations, and the sale of prohibited medical products. Based on publicly available data from Meta’s Ad Library, 5.9 million advertisements generated


Over 50k ads on social media impersonated Interpol, Europol, and EU Institutions, promising “fraud refunds”
In about a year, over 50 million Europeans on Facebook and Instagram have been exposed to ads falsely claiming that fraud victims are being refunded. In reality, these ads direct users to fake portals designed to capture personal data and extract upfront “fees” under the pretext of refund processing. A large network of Facebook and Instagram advertisements impersonated Interpol, Europol, national “cyber police,” EU institutions, and other official bodies. The ads claimed they


The Belarusian Silovik Telegram Channel: Amplifying Pro-Kremlin Narratives
Understanding the Belarusian Silovik Channel The Belarusian Silovik Telegram channel, controlled by Belarus’s GUBOPiK agency, amplifies pro-Kremlin narratives, particularly those related to the war in Ukraine. In addition to the Sprinter network, previously identified as the channel’s primary amplifier on X (formerly Twitter), our new research reveals a broader network of accounts echoing its disinformation in Japan, Poland, India, and the United States. Initially, Belarusian


Weaponising the Vote: How a No-Confidence Fueled a Discreditation Campaign on EC President von der Leyen
Kremlin-linked outlets and aligned influencers launched a narrative assault targeting Ursula von der Leyen during a crucial no-confidence...


Bust-AD: Russian-backed Deepfake of a Lithuanian 3 Plus News Reporter Appears on Facebook, Urging ‘Scam Victims’ to File for Money Reimbursement Claim under Interpol
A deepfake video featuring a Russian-speaking TV news reporter from 3 Plus, a channel aired in Latvia, has been flagged for falsely advertising a fraudulent initiative to return lost money to scam victims. This manipulated video, which appears to be an excerpt from a legitimate news report by TV3 Group - a prominent news conglomerate in the Baltic states - has been disseminated through a surge of Facebook advertisements. The ads impersonate the International Criminal Police O


The Sprinter Network: Unmasking the Disinformation Web
The "Sprinter" network on X (formerly Twitter) is a complex web of fake accounts that spread pro-Kremlin disinformation. Our investigation reveals that these accounts, automated and inauthentic, coordinate efforts to amplify harmful political narratives. By uncovering links to a Belarusian state operative-controlled Telegram channel, we trace the operations of the Sprinter network to actors linked to government-sponsored disinformation. This report examines how these networks


AI-powered Propaganda Operation “Overload”: Debunk.org’s Case (Part 2)
We have analysed the content of 339 emails we received as one of the organisations targeted in Operation “Overload.” During this...


Bust-AD: Fake ads infestation on Facebook
We have uncovered a network of domains and Facebook pages that have shared nearly 3,000 dubious ads during a year. The ads predominantly...


Bust-AD: Crypto Ads Scam in Montenegro
In Montenegro, users of Meta social media platforms have been targeted by misleading advertisements promoting various cryptocurrency...


Bust-AD: Deepfake of Montenegrin minister advertising anti-foot fungus treatment appears on social media
A deepfake in which Montenegrin Government minister of spatial planning, urbanism and state property, Slaven Radunović, allegedly...


Operation “Overload”: Debunk.org’s Case
Debunk.org is one of the numerous media and organisations targeted by the Operation "Overload". In this campaign, pro-Russian actors have...


Doppelganger journalist FIMI incident from Belarus National State TV against Lithuanian president elections 2024 candidates
A lack of attention to the details nearly costed two Lithuanian presidential candidates their credibility. Misled by the email adress,...


Rabbit Holes and Echo Chambers. Part 4: Experimenting with Tik Tok
In the first experiment, we put YouTube’s rabbit holes under scrutiny, and despaired watching how easy it is to fall into anti-vaxxer...


Rabbit Holes and Echo Chambers. Part 3: Experimenting with Instagram
In the first experiment , we looked at the way YouTube allowed the creation of rabbit holes into anti-vaxxer disinformation. We also...
bottom of page