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184 results found for "social media misinformation"

  • Lithuania manipulates Ukraine: portrayal of the Gitanas Nauseda and Volodymyr Zelensky meeting

    and 2 content pieces as misinformation related to the meeting of the President of Ukraine and the President The pro-Kremlin media outlets sputniknews.ru, baltnews.lt, sputniknews.lt and rossaprimavera.ru (also “Glory to Ukraine” became a symbol during the “Revolution of Dignity”, thereby pro-Kremlin media aimed Target audiences Disinformation and misinformation spread by pro-Kremlin and non-systemic Lithuanian media on meeting of Gitanas Nauseda and Volodymyr Zelenskyy has potentially reached around 14 million

  • ‘The EU is failing the fight with COVID-19’: increased tensions amplify pro-Kremlin coverage

    has continued to grow, evidenced in the less sporadic nature of sharing false and misleading content (misinformation In fact, the same story can be used to spread both misinformation and disinformation. Misinformation example: a Facebook post has been shared about the death, providing a link to a mainstream Therefore, the post has been qualified as misinformation. down production because of deaths among vaccine recipients, which circulated via a video shared on social

  • Rabbit Holes and Echo Chambers. Part 4: Experimenting with Tik Tok

    We also provided an overview of how social media work in general, which we recommend to check out. A different threat from TikTok Some preliminary notes TikTok is a much newer social media, and has had TikTok does not really work through “echo chambers” like other social media: Instead, it seems to give Conclusions None of the social media we experimented with gave us a sense of resilience from disinformation As to social media companies, a lot more is definitely needed to keep their environments safe from disinformation

  • Operation “Overload”: Debunk.org’s Case

    Debunk.org is one of the numerous media and organisations targeted by the Operation "Overload". media tags each demanding the same - to verify the dubious content they found online. , political allegations, and social issues. Similar themes are observed, such as allegations against the Ukrainian government and military, misinformation , political allegations, social issues, and international events.

  • Baltic countries and Poland face accusations of Russophobia and mishandling COVID-19

    Kremlin-related digital media sources linked the events in Latvia and Estonia and used it to spread disinformation This event busted a spread of anti-vaccine messages shared widely on social media platforms. The article presented hereby gathered the highest social media reach among the mis/disinformation in The coronavirus vaccine is used to spread general misinformation about vaccinations, replicating false of social interactions, also showing the highest efficiency rate with regards to this parameter.

  • Escalation of accusations targeting Poland as a Russophobic state

    In January 2021, Debunk EU experts spotted 452 articles with disinformation and 5 with misinformation Due to this improvement diversification of media outlets was spotted. In December, the leading media source was nczas.com – in January it fell to the fifth place. and runs educational media literacy campaigns. Debunk EU was noticed by such media giants as “The Financial Times” and “Deutsche Welle”.

  • Rabbit Holes and Echo Chambers. Part 3: Experimenting with Instagram

    We also provided an overview of how social media work in general, which we recommend checking out. The dark side of an apparently “light” media For this experiment, we created two separate Instagram accounts Stories are harder to check for social media themselves (assuming they even want to check them) and for Engagement through novelty is the mechanism that Instagram’s algorithm appears to follow: If the social media sees that you expressed interest and were engaged on a certain topic, it will feed you more and

  • COVID-19 Conspirators Side with Russia: Hyperbolising Inflation and Supply Chain Disruptions

    From June 01 to July 31, 2022, among the 801 analyzed articles, 382 (48%) were found to have misinformation The rest 419 articles (52%) are either accurate reporting or include misinformation or disinformation He was called “the most influential spreader of coronavirus misinformation” by The New York Times. Media Sources The majority of labelled articles are disinformation. Most misinformation is from articles that contain inaccurate new COVID-19 case counts [4].

  • "This is not the second Chernobyl" and other narratives used to cover up accidents at BelNPP

    In this regard, disinformation constituted 89.10% while misinformation – 10.90% of the articles published and distributed by the Kremlin-funded (or affiliated) media outlets, and social media accounts. /misinformation recorded cases. It appeared in the pro-Kremlin media to emphasise that the Lithuanian government is to blame for the The pro-Kremlin media endeavoured to create an allusion that the so-called hackers, who allegedly broke

  • 'Aggressive' and 'breaking its promises': portrayal of NATO activities in the Baltics

    topics discussed by Kremlin-related media. The main distributors of NATO-related disinformation and misinformation in the Baltic countries in Russian misinformation comprised only 14 publications (0.45%). The main distributors of NATO-related disinformation and misinformation in the Baltic countries were pages on Facebook in Lithuania were leading in terms of mentions produced, no unifying pattern between social

  • Rabbit Holes and Echo Chambers. Part 2: Experimenting with Facebook

    We encourage you to check that one out first, as you will also find a general explanation of how social media works. media decides you have to see. Facebook whistleblowers already alleged that the social media’s algorithm is designed in a way that dangerously social media allegedly encouraged users to engage with has strained or destroyed people’s relationships

  • AI-powered Propaganda Operation “Overload”: Debunk.org’s Case (Part 2)

    , and social issues.   Over 80% of the media shared was classified as disinformative.Debunk.org partnered with the MeVer group analyses and forensics on different forms of media. Around 83% of all media shared has been deemed manipulated to disinform. literacy to polarise and form misinformed beliefs surrounding these groups.

  • Weaponising the Vote: How a No-Confidence Fueled a Discreditation Campaign on EC President von der Leyen

    A coordinated echo chamber spanning Russian state media, social media manipulation, and paid ads magnified Debunk.org reviewed 284 articles from Kremlin-aligned sources, plus selected posts on social media platforms Social Media Amplification for European Audiences - The case of X This wave of criticism was not limited media platforms, online ads, and media content. Debunk.org ’s analysis of 284 articles and selected social media content revealed that two core narratives

  • Documentary “Truth as a Weapon”

    How do you successfully fight disinformation and lies? Constantly, Russian trolls are producing whole and half falsehoods, and fake news that appears on social media and news sites. They have been bombarded with disinformation from Russia for years. monitors the media 24 hours a day for fake news.

  • Anatomy of Covid-19 conspiracy theories in Poland

    Such statements are being published on some media outlets and then they are vividly shared via social media. 10% of disinformation. The most prevailing three media outlets neon24.pl, wolnemedia.net and alternews.pl - spreading conspiracy Truly Media - collaboration platform developed to support primarily journalists in the verification

  • NATO targeted with false narratives about ‘offensive’ exercises and stirring protests in Russia

    Recent analysis has shown that hostile media sources have switched their focus from the military agenda They were distributed in 82 media outlets in the Baltic countries in English, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian In January, hostile media showed slightly higher interest in political agenda of NATO, focusing on the This change was significantly affected by increased interest of the Kremlin-related media outlets in The main distributors of NATO-related disinformation & misinformation in the Baltic countries were technowar.ru

  • 2024 Elections: Case Studies of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference in EU

    This distrust creates a fertile ground for disinformation to “propagate”.  Both of the narrative types work together in disinformation campaigns, criticizing Western countries Health-related disinformation, such as linking immigrants to public health risks, further erodes trust The content they produced was disseminated using social media amplification among others by trolls and Understanding these TTPs can better counteract disinformation campaigns and their impacts. 

  • Vassals of the West: tensions surrounding Navalny case provoke allegations of foreign interference

    related to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland with potentially harmful content posted by hostile media Of these, 2,226 articles with false and misleading content from 146 media sources (including 54 Facebook /02/2021) Our verdict: The article comes as a part of several meta-narratives traced in pro-Kremlin media Bans on some Russian media outlets which were imposed by Latvia and considered by Lithuania were used as an alleged proof of breachingthe freedom of speech and a hostile attack on Russian media in the Baltics

  • Bust-AD: Crypto Ads Scam in Montenegro

    In Montenegro, users of Meta social media platforms have been targeted by misleading advertisements promoting In August and September, an unidentified group or individual targeted Meta’s social media users in Montenegro A social media user who overlooks the often laughably bad photo edits of supposed arrests or the clumsy Networks TA09: Deliver Content:  T0114.001: Social media C - CONTENT Most of the efforts in this scam Scammers are counting on the fact that the attention span on social media is very modest and that the

  • Debunker: 'Ukrainian refugees are prioritised over host country citizens'

    anti-refugee voices in order to create a skewed perception of public support for Ukraine.[8] Pro-Kremlin media characteristics which will facilitate their integration prospects, including: educational profile, existing social [7] https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet? 10] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/ukraine-refugees-eu/ [11] https://www.unhcr.org/media /convention-and-protocol-relating-status-refugees [12] https://www.unhcr.org/media/convention-and-protocol-relating-status-refugees

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