Weaponising the Vote: How a No-Confidence Fueled a Discreditation Campaign on EC President von der Leyen

Kremlin-linked outlets and aligned influencers launched a narrative assault targeting Ursula von der Leyen during a crucial no-confidence debate. The campaign was anchored by two core claims—corruption and calls for removal—supported by recurring frames of EU decline and anti-Russia bias. A coordinated echo chamber spanning Russian state media, social media manipulation, and paid ads magnified these narratives.

In July 2025, just as the European Parliament debated whether to remove Ursula von der Leyen from her role as European Commission President, Russian state media and pro-Kremlin websites launched a wave of negative coverage targeting her. This coordinated campaign peaked between July 7 and 13, around the time of the no-confidence vote, which ultimately failed.

The campaign pushed two main messages:

1. That von der Leyen should be removed from office.

2. That she is corrupt and acted in the interests of pharmaceutical companies during the COVID-19 pandemic.

   
   

These claims were part of a broader pattern of disinformation that often appears during moments of political tension in the EU. In this case, the allegations were linked to the so-called “Pfizergate” vaccine controversy. Although the motion to remove von der Leyen was rejected by a wide margin, the surrounding media storm helped amplify distrust in her leadership.

Debunk.org reviewed 284 articles from Kremlin-aligned sources, plus selected posts on social media platforms like X (formerly Twitter) and Facebook. The findings show that the same messages were repeated across major Russian media outlets and smaller fringe websites—suggesting that this wasn’t a random backlash, but a planned effort to undermine von der Leyen and the EU’s image more broadly.

Our analysis also showed that the most common claims were the ones seen by the most people. In other words, the more a narrative was repeated, the more it was promoted through high-visibility media channels. This kind of messaging consistency is a hallmark of disinformation tactics that aim to influence public opinion during politically sensitive moments.

Introduction

Between July 7 and 11, Russian state media and pro-Russian outlets intensified their criticism of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. This surge in coverage coincided with a no-confidence vote in the European Parliament, suggesting a possible attempt to shape public perception during a politically sensitive moment. The procedure was initiated by Romanian MEP Gheorghe Piperea, a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, citing transparency concerns linked to the "Pfizergate" vaccine case, and his motion gathered 72 signatures. On 10 July 2025, the European Parliament voted and the censure motion failed: 175 MEPs supported it, 360 opposed, with 18 abstentions.

The examples above show how Kremlin-aligned media and Russian political figures used provocative language, recycled conspiracy claims, and emotionally charged framing to attack Ursula von der Leyen during the no-confidence vote.

One article portrays her as a “Stalin-like” unelected leader, linking the vote to broader claims that the EU is undemocratic and corrupt. Another features Russian official Kirill Dmitriev blaming von der Leyen for Europe’s economic decline, contrasting Russia’s “vaccine leadership” with alleged EU corruption. A third example shows Dmitry Medvedev insulting von der Leyen directly, accusing her of Pfizer-related misconduct and portraying her as a Russophobic figure facing collapse. 

The three mentioned are a part of 284 articles in total that the Debunk.org analysts team examined from the Kremlin-aligned online media sources in a period before and shortly after the non-confidence vote - from July 7 to 13.

The dynamics chart highlights which narratives surged on particular days and how several of them clustered around the no-confidence vote, suggesting they were promoted in close temporal proximity.

Two narratives dominated the space — Removal and Corruption together account for nearly 65% of all narrative mentions, confirming them as the core messaging pillars of the campaign. The remaining narratives acted as reinforcing frames — collapse, illegitimacy, and anti-Russia obsession — where they extended and amplified delegitimising, manipulative frames about von der Leyen and the EU.

The alignment between frequency and reach was clear: the narratives that appeared most often — such as “Von der Leyen must be removed” or “She is a corrupt elite who betrayed Europe” — were also those that had the highest reach. This suggests that these weren’t fringe ideas circulating only in marginal blogs or local outlets; instead, they were amplified by large, far-reaching media organisations, like RIA Novosti or other prominent Kremlin-aligned platforms, as well.

We don’t see a clear divide where some narratives were pushed mostly by low-audience outlets and others by major state media. Instead, it appears that the same key narratives were both repeated widely and pushed through channels with the largest audiences — a sign of broad consistency in messaging across the monitored ecosystem.

This pattern suggests the discrediting messaging in our monitored sample was highly consistent across outlets rather than scattered, with the highest-profile narratives receiving both substantial volume and estimated visibility (DebunkReach®) within the sample.

We compared how widely each anti–von der Leyen narrative spread against how often it appeared across the articles (see Narrative Impact Matrix: the vertical axis shows total DebunkReach®; the horizontal axis shows mentions; bubble size indicates how many distinct media sources carried the narrative).

Two narratives dominated both volume and reach: “Von der Leyen Must Be Removed” and “Von der Leyen Is a Corrupt Elite / Pfizer Profits”. They appeared frequently and were amplified across the largest number of outlets, marking them as the campaign’s core messaging pillars. A second tier — “EU Into Collapse” and “Illegitimate / Undemocratic EU” — shows lower repetition but still significant DebunkReach®, indicating these frames were strategically layered into high-visibility coverage to reinforce doubt in EU governance.

The “Anti-Russia Obsession / Ukraine Aid” narrative sat well below the others on both axes and is carried by far fewer sources, suggesting it functioned as a contextual or situational add-on rather than a lead attack theme. The overall pattern — high reach aligning with high repetition for the top two narratives, and meaningful cross-outlet pickup for the next tier — points to broad consistency across the monitored Kremlin-aligned media.

The Narrative Co-occurrence Network visualises how propaganda narratives about Ursula von der Leyen, found in Kremlin-aligned media, appeared together within the same articles. Each node in the graph represents a specific narrative (e.g., portraying von der Leyen as corrupt, unelected, or driving the EU into collapse). The edges (lines) between nodes indicate that two narratives co-occurred in one or more articles, with the thickness of the line reflecting how frequently that co-occurrence occurred.

This network layout reveals how propaganda narratives are strategically bundled. The tightly connected clusters suggest an intent to reinforce a broader delegitimising framework by presenting overlapping and emotionally resonant claims. The closer the circles are and the thicker the lines between them, the more often those ideas were linked. This helps us see how different claims were combined to create a stronger and more persuasive story. For instance, calling von der Leyen corrupt was often paired with claims that she’s unelected or ruining the EU economy.

Instead of using just one argument, these articles often layered several narratives together to make their framing more convincing. The chart shows the structure behind these efforts — not random criticism, but a coordinated way of telling a bigger story meant for both domestically consumed outlets and providing shareable “evidence” to circulate in pro-Kremlin networks. The narrative bundles were used to degrade the EU and von der Leyen—depicting them as failing, corrupt, or illegitimate in ways that resonate with both external and domestic audiences, as well as to reinforce the Kremlin’s long-running narrative that “the West is decaying, hypocritical, and hostile to Russia” — bolstering regime legitimacy, sanction endurance, and in-group cohesion domestically.

Some sources — such as cont.ws, RT.com, and EADaily — actively promoted multiple narratives, suggesting their role as central amplifiers within the disinformation ecosystem. Other sources, like pnp.ru or pravda.ru, focused more narrowly but still repeated core messages.

The chart reveals a pattern alignment and narrative consistency: nearly all sources touched on the dominant themes, with particular emphasis on portraying von der Leyen as corrupt, illegitimate, or driving the EU into collapse. This may suggest not a fragmented media effort, but a broadly aligned messaging pattern, where key narratives were echoed across multiple platforms to reinforce their impact.

Across the ~280-article monitored sample, the same quoted figures driving disinformation and propaganda frames (Corruption, Removal, EU Collapse, Russophobia) appeared in both major Kremlin-aligned outlets and smaller portals—no fringe/mainstream divide. Procedural actors tied to the no-confidence motion—especially Romanian MEP Gheorghe Piperea—were repeatedly cited to legitimise corruption allegations and calls for von der Leyen’s removal. Elite Russian voices escalated the framing: Dmitry Medvedev’s Telegram insults and Pfizer-corruption claims, and Kirill Dmitriev’s “deindustrialization/decline” line, gave Kremlin imprimatur to the narratives. Internal EU critics were also leveraged; Viktor Orban was widely referenced to suggest intra-EU dissatisfaction with von der Leyen and the broader Brussels agenda. Taken together, these attributions show recurring, cross-outlet reuse of a small set of dominant distorted narratives, rather than scattered, isolated commentary.

To illustrate how the tracked narratives functioned in practice, we reviewed Kremlin-aligned media articles published around the July 2025 no-confidence vote window. Each carries one or more of the dominant disinformation narratives identified in our analysis. Together they show three common techniques: Across them we see recurring tactics: (1) blaming von der Leyen personally for EU decline (EADaily); (2) injecting Pfizer corruption claims and anti-“Russophobe” rhetoric through a senior Russian figure (Medvedev via TASS); and (3) using the no-confidence process to portray her as unelected or illegitimate (RT).

Social Media Amplification for European Audiences - The case of X

This wave of criticism was not limited to Russian outlets. State-aligned media in China (such as CGTN) and Venezuela (such as Telesur), along with Hungarian conservative, and nationalist political figures. For instance, the account of CGTN in French “CGTN Français” posted 10 tweets about the no-confidence vote.

The reports portrayed von der Leyen as weak, incompetent, and corrupt. They repeated earlier allegations of misconduct related to COVID-19 vaccine procurement and questioned her leadership and character. While these claims are not new, their resurgence at this specific moment appeared timed to undermine her position.

However, a statement posted on July 9 by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán played a central role in this wave of criticism. His message, which featured an edited image of von der Leyen resembling a Time magazine cover with the headline “Time to go,” was widely used to question her leadership and legitimacy.

Google Trends data shows that global search interest in “von der Leyen” peaked on July 9, particularly in Hungary—the same day Viktor Orbán published  his tweet calling for her resignation. This timing suggests that Orbán’s post acted as a catalyst for increased visibility and engagement. Orbán’s tweet received over 4.4 million views on X, over 100.000 likes and almost 20.000 retweets, and it was promptly re-shared by Russian media outlets from the accounts of the RT network: RT, RT in German and RT in Spanish.

Orban’s tweet sparked a reaction across pro-Russian and anti-EU accounts, which shared content in multiple languages calling for von der Leyen’s resignation. The phrases “Time to go” and  “censure motion” were adapted into several languages, such as in German “Misstrauensantrag” and in Spanish “Es hora de irse”, and circulated across social media platforms, online ads, and media content.

Mentions peaked between July 9 and 10, appearing on platforms such as X, in Meta Ads, and across state-aligned media channels, suggesting a concerted effort to amplify negative sentiment during a politically sensitive period for the European Union. The coverage aligned with broader Russian narratives that portray the European Union as unstable and divided, and its leadership as ineffective.

Conclusion

The July 2025 campaign to discredit Ursula von der Leyen illustrates how Kremlin-aligned actors mobilise coordinated narratives to exploit politically sensitive moments within the EU. Anchored in claims of corruption and demands for her removal, the campaign used a mix of emotional rhetoric, recycled conspiracy theories, and high-visibility media amplification to undermine both von der Leyen and the European Commission more broadly.

Debunk.org’s analysis of 284 articles and selected social media content revealed that two core narratives—“von der Leyen must be removed” and “she is corrupt”—accounted for nearly two-thirds of all relevant mentions. These narratives were not confined to fringe outlets; they were consistently echoed across major Kremlin-controlled platforms like RT, RIA Novosti, and TASS, as well as smaller pro-Russian websites.

While the no-confidence vote failed, the surrounding media storm succeeded in elevating propaganda narratives into the mainstream discourse. The same Kremlin messaging pillars—corruption, collapse, illegitimacy—remain active and influential in parts of the EU, particularly where domestic actors align with or amplify these frames for political gain.